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A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
The analysis of monetary policy in Tunisia highlights three main distinct 
periods with the support of the IMF: the last in 1987 when the country was 
in deep recession, after 1989 with the gradual privatization plan launched 
by the government and recently current period in the end of 2012, after 
revolution, in which the economic and financial balance recorded major 
shocks remanding back of the ex-period and the rise in arrow of the 
inflation. This article aims to provide an overview on key reforms Tunisian 
financial markets from 1989. These reforms have particularly affected the 
banking system and the implementation of monetary policy based on the 
interest rate as an instrument controller for the first phase and also the 
monetary aggregates, M3 mainly, following the evolution of economic 
conditions to our days 2014. But from the 90's view that the success 
recorded by the industrialized countries precursors on Inflation Targeting 
strategy IT and some developing countries as follower, we will demonstrate 
the inability of the Tunisian Central Bank TCB to pursue this inflation target 
announce strategy as a primary objective and the main difficulties before its 
actual realization in the current difficult economic environment. 
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A range of measures of monetary policy was engaged since the financial reform finally 80's of the last 
century, built around a program aimed at consolidating the market economy system where the instruments 
of indirect control override those of direct control. At the favor of the liberalization of the banking activities 
at the end of the 80s of last century, monetary authorities are attached to implement prudential regulation 
consistent with international standards for the consolidation financial base of the banks. 
Usually, in the context of monetary policy, the monetary authorities Curkierman A. (1992) set a final goal 
and intermediate objectives. The hierarchy of these objectives, which differs from one economy to another, 
reveals in Tunisia a clear dominance of the control of inflation, considered necessary to the effectiveness of 
any policy aimed at strengthening the competitiveness of an economy more and more subject to the 
mechanisms of the international market. 
Thus, the implementation by the Central Bank monetary policy has the ultimate objective of monetary 
stability, and by controlling the inflation rate close to that observed in the partner countries and competitors. 
To achieve this ultimate objective of monetary policy Smida M. and Boughrara A. (2004), the Tunisian 
Central Bank (TCB) uses a monetary aggregate as an intermediate target. The operational target adopted is 
essentially the interest rate and reserve requirement, exchange rate, etc. 
Over the years, the nature and monetary policy tools had to be modified Cukierman A. and Meltzer A. (1986) 
on several occasions, as a result not only of the appearance of cyclical events, but also the succession of 
different economic strategies and the crossing of above steps in economic and social development. These 
actions clearly reflected at the level of monetary policy which accompanies them. 
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The analysis of monetary policy in Tunisia highlights three distinct periods which extended up to 1986, year 
of the adoption of the structural adjustment plan (SAP1), during which monetary policy was passive. The 
second period was beginning in 1987, year of the entry into force of the financial reform that has designed a 
new approach to the conduct of monetary policy and has set a new framework for its operation. The third 
period is coinciding with the latest financial crisis in 2008 and the period post-revolution 2012, where the 
country is succeeding by several major economic shocks. The main, according to expert economists, had 
been that the year 2012 where inflation is accentuating from 3.1 % finally 2008 to 6.7% in 2012.  
The Tunisian Central Bank TCB, acting as autonomous Castello M. and Swinburne M. (1992) to maintain 
its monetary policy, fulfilled all his own instruments Patat J-P. (1986) useful from the rate of inflation as a 
first tool of control towards intermediate targets and even together with the decision of the liquidation of 
some public banks in difficult situations in the end of 2012 under the pressure of the IMF2. In addition, the 
TCB continued to support other national banks to not fall into bankruptcy. Despite a few adjustments 
registered in the end of 2013 by a rate of inflation in vicinity of 6.1%, all these regulatory measures by the 
TCB brought only short-term affects under the Structural Reform Plan (SRP3) provided by the IMF in 2012. 
Although, the inflation targeting (IT) strategy proves impractical for economic circumstances where happen 
to the country, in their phase post-revolution 2011. 
Generally, to ensure the transition and to succeed the method of monetary regulation by the market, monetary 
policy Walsh, Carl E., (1997) must inevitably take into account the dynamics of financial reform and the 
profound changes that are currently mark the global economic and financial environment. These changes 
continue to impose a necessary improvement of the efficiency of the Tunisian economy, consolidation of its 
opening to the outside and a promotion of financial innovations. 
These new data show that the financial landscape transforms by an abundance of hybrid products combining 
good yields, an immediate liquidity and low risk of fluctuation in the value of the investment capital. These 
new financial products contribute to enhance the role of market intermediation and to decline of classical 
banking intermediation in financing the economy. However, these profound changes are likely to increase 
the volatility of money demand, pose question of the effectiveness of the monetary aggregate as an 
intermediary objective. Financial liberalization adopted by Tunisia since 1987 is likely to push the monetary 
authorities to reshape monetary policy instruments and their modes of interventions by taking into account 
the new datum.  
In this article, we will present, Firstly, the main regulatory changes in the Tunisian financial sphere and the 
reorganization of the Tunisian capital Market (1989-2010) as a result of measures recommended by the IMF 
for gradual economic and financial liberalization. Secondly, we propose to study the current situation of 
monetary policy and the role assigned to the Tunisian Central Bank (TCB) to preserve the value of the local 
currency and to control, specially, the inflation rate. Finally, we close this paper on the real obstacles facing 
the adoption of the guidelines Inflation Target (IT) Strategy by the Tunisian Central Bank (TCB), in the 
current difficult economic environment. 
 
 
2. EVOLUTION OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REORGANIZATION OF 
TUNISIAN MONEY MARKET (1989-2010): MAJOR REFORMS 
 
In Tunisia, the economic environment has experienced many changes that have had a direct impact on the 
actual variables of the economy. It has involved economic and financial liberalization measures have adopted 
within the framework of the Adjustment Structural Plan (ASP) has advocated by the IMF in 19864. By 
including privatization of some large companies, the establishment of a new regulation regarding the 
procurement of Tunisian capital, from 1989, (money market, financial market and exchange market) and the 
gradual liberalization of interest rates. 
                                                             
1 In 1986, the monetary authorities have undertaken to implement the following indirect control instruments; (1) partial and continuous rate liberalization of interest 
debtor and credit, (2) reorganization of the money market to perform operations of purchase and sale of securities and for the issuance of titles like tickets of cash 
flows, (3) removal of formalities prior permission and the agreement of rediscount to the loans granted by the banks and the introduction of instruments for 
monitoring of credit as reserves held at the TCB and the repo and also the operation of the open - Market.etc, (4) introduction of prudential standards in the Bank 
management and the implementation of the rules which must be observed by banks. 
2 cf. International Monetary Found rapport:  Impression for Tunisia government and economic assessment, after last revelation 2011, (Nov. 2012). 
3 IMF: rapport for Tunisia, Dec 2012. 
4 The country experienced a severe economic recession unprecedented in their economic history. 
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2.1. Main indicators of the banking system before the reforms 
The national Banking system was partitioning in the early 1980s. It was composing primarily of deposits 
banks and development banks which were respectively specializing in short-term and medium-term and 
long-term financing. Commercial Banks financed through deposits, term savings, which accounted for about 
two-thirds of their total resources. They enjoyed facilities rediscount and advances amounting to 17.5% of 
their deposits.  
Development Banks had access to special government resources and other resources obtained from abroad 
to the financing of certain credits. They were not allow to accept deposits except in special circumstances, 
so they therefore had to resort to the above-mentioned special resources as well as their own funds and 
issuing long-term bonds, generally. 
This fragmentation limited competition. It was also reinforced by careful controls of both credits than 
debtor’s interest rates, as well as commissions. Real interest rates were often negative. There was also a 
refinancing agreement authorization system which restricted the type of credits and prevented Banks to offer 
different funding modalities. 
Money market looked more like a Central Bank rediscounting window. Transactions inter-Bank prohibited 
and the Central Bank determined both the interest rate and refinancing granted to each Bank. In addition, 
commercial Banks were subject to obligations of a portfolio. As a result, Banks were hardly motivated to 
assess their credit decisions outside the criteria laid down by the Central Bank for refinancing. 
2.2. Main indicators of the financial system before the reforms 
Concerning the Tunisian financial market, its role in the financing of the economy was very small. The 
capitalization of the Tunisian Stock Exchange (T.S.E) was low on 90’s in last century. This reflected to the 
desire to lock capital Firms and the fear of the entrepreneurs of any shareholding foreign to the family 
ownership rate or close acquaintances rate.  
These structural reasons for the weakness of the market, in addition to other causes including: 
• The encouragement of bank savings which was well paid and loosely imposed while equity capitals had 
disadvantages from the tax point of view. 
• Encouragement, also the debt at the expense of participation by the politics of easy subsidized credits 
and by the requirement of a down payment minimal when granting loans. 
• The lack of obligation to inform the public and the inadequacy of the control exercised by the Stock 
Exchange. 
• The lack of professional ethics and self-regulation of the profession, result of the marginalization of 
securities services in banks that dominated the market until 1994. 
2.3. Finance Reforms after 1989 
These reforms have affected all financial transactions Lassoued (2004) in terms of: 
 
2.3.1. Credit policy and interest rate 
In the context of the overall reform of monetary policy and credit, the Tunisian Central Bank (TCB) has 
changed licensing terms, control and refinancing of credits from December 19875. 
The progressive release of receivable interest rates provide to banks more freedom in the decision of credits 
granting. Indeed, while respecting theoretical ratings, banks freely set their margins6 with the exception of 
the priority areas, the rate has remained fixed by the Central Bank until November 1996. 
The interest rates on deposits have released except those accounts in convertible dinars (average rate of 
money market less than two points). The discount as a refinancing technique removed in November 1996, 
with the elimination of the reserve interest rate, previously to priority activities. The average monthly Rate 
of Money Market (MMR) has replaced the discount as interest rate. Exchanges of cash between banks are 
exclusively on the money market where the theoretically variable rate is kept stable by the Tunisian Central 
Bank, through its interventions in the market. 
2.3.2. Financial market reforms  
This reform is on the strengthening of integration within the financial market. Indeed, the Tunisian financial 
                                                             
5 Bank circulars N° 87-47,on 23/12/1987. 
6 Since : June 15/1994. 
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system is characterized by segmentation and partitioning that marks the area of activity of the institutions. 
The latter has a special role in the mobilization of savings and investment financing. 
A new law enacted concerning compulsory loans, Investment in Fixed and Variable Capital Companies 
(IFCC and IVCC)7 and a new status of the stock exchange8. Tax incentives to Companies that opened their 
capital to the public which grantee this idea. This is to encourage popular shareholdings which take over the 
State in the capital of the enterprises for privatization. 
2.3.3. The Tunisian Bank System TBS 
Banking regulation amended by the creation of Investment banks in Tunisia in 19949. Monetary authorities 
seek to develop activities of Council and assistance in the management of the assets, financial engineering 
and the creation, development and the restructuring of enterprises. 
With a view to opening the banking system to foreign capital a new law introduced in 200110 to define the 
notion of credit institutions. This law totally reforms the Tunisian Banking System TBS by introducing the 
concept of Universal Bank. Development banks no longer exist in Tunisia following merger-absorption and 
transformation operations. 
2.3.3.1. Reorganization of the Money Market 
New marketable debt instruments in the money market have been created (certificates of deposit, commercial 
paper and Treasury bills) and the Central Bank has been started to conduct its monetary policy in relying 
primarily on the monetary market. 
This policy reinforced by a new organization of the monetary market in 200511 that allow the Central Bank 
to be more effectively use the technique of Open-Market which enable panoply of Government securities to 
be more useful than companies and individual’s securities. Also, through the reform of the financial system, 
there is a change in monetary policy to do regulation by market forces games. 
The monetary regulation is therefore ensured by means of action by interest rates instead of the 
administrative mechanisms of cap credit and quantitative control. 
2.3.3.2. Prudential standards 
The Tunisian Central Bank TCB has regulated liabilities of banks due to the risks incurring by their credit 
activity. This is due to some bank failures relate to a bad division risks and also in the context of the new 
policy of credit, based on a control a posteriori. Thus, the Central Bank issues accounting rules and prudential 
standards applicable to banks and financial institutions12. These standards concern: the use of own funds, 
the ratios between shareholder’s funds and liabilities, the ratios between capitals which grantee debtor to 
each and ; that encourage  competition which risks in general aspect. 
We summarize in table 2 (in annex) mutations in the financial system before and after financial liberalization 
taking as reference date the year 1989. This typology inspired and adapted to developing countries in 
particular for the formal sectors distinguishing between a regulated financial system and a liberalized 
financial system. It derived from the work of Mc Kinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) that distinguished between 
financial repression and financial liberalization. 
Thanks to these criteria, we can advance the hypothesis that the evolution of the Tunisian financial system 
constitutes a passage of a financial system based on Bank and administered to a financial system based on 
the Bank, in the process of liberalization, with domination of the financial institutions. 
 
 
3. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR MONETARY POLICY IN TUNISIA AND 
DIFFICULTY OF THE TARGETING STRATEGY: INSTRUMENTS, LIQUIDITY 
MANAGEMENT AND EXECUTION  
 
 
3.1. Role assigned to the Tunisian Central Bank TCB 
 
                                                             
7 Law N°88-92 of 2/8/1988 (JORT of 2/8/1988) 
8 Law N°89-49 of 8/3/1989 (JORT of 21/3/1989) 
9 Law N°94-25 of February 7th, 1994. 
10 Law N°2001-65 of July 10th, 2001. 
11 Circular in credit institutions, N°2005-09,of July 14th, 2005. 
12 Circular N°91-24 of December 17th, 1991 such as modified by the circular to banks, n°99-04, of March 19th, 1999. 
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The objective assigned to the TCB was the stability of the value of the currency by controlling the rate of 
inflation to a level close to that of the partner countries and competitors. Monetary stability means a 
minimum inflation Friedman M. (1968), equilibrium for payments balance and a stable exchange rate in real 
terms, to preserve the competitiveness of the economy. The intermediate goal is to correlate the growth of 
the monetary mass with that of economic activity. Conduct Guillard M. (2002) current monetary policy 
favors the interest rate to ensure a decisive role in the mobilization of savings and the optimal allocation of 
resources. 
Since the year 2000, and to carry out the fine adjustment of bank liquidity, the Central Bank has disconnected 
the rate of one-off operations to 24 hours from the tender. Thus, the interest rate of the injection and puncture 
–aspiration- of the Central Bank operations are laid down, respectively, 1/16 point and more and 1/16 less 
than the tender.  
 
3.2. Instruments of monetary policy: Central Bank intervention in the money market 
 
The Central Bank has a wide range of monetary policy instruments. To manage the liquidity on the money 
market and guide short-term interest rate, it uses the open-Market operations that allow injecting liquidity 
into the banking system on receipt of adequate safeguards. In addition, credit institutions require the hold of 
fraction and reserves in their accounts at the Central Bank. Essentially procedures and instruments of 
monetary policy Haddou S. (2003) fit into the continuity of those used for financial reform. 
Table.1. Technical interventions of the Central Bank in the money market 
Nature of 
transaction 
Tender Repurchase Agreement Specific operations (Injection or puncture) 
Period 7 days. From 7 days to 3 months.  Just in 24 hours. 
Rate Fixed by the TCB.13 Indexed on the behalf of 
tender with simple major 
increase14 
Determined by market conditions15 
Technical Purchases effects or 
debt held by banks. 
The sale of debt securities 
which carry a right of 
redemption on a specific 
date, increased by a rate of 
interest. 
Two cases: if there is insufficient liquidity 
TCB operated ultimately to increase the 
liquidity in the money market. 2nd case, 
where there is excess liquidity, the Central 
Bank intervened to absorb the liquidity in the 
market. 
Banks Deposit banks acting 
for theirs own 
accounts or on behalf 
of investment banks. 
Deposit banks. Deposit banks. 
Source: Financial Statistics, TCB 2013. 
 
On the monetary market the Central Bank TCB may intervene to provide liquidity in various forms as shown 
in table1. Actually, TCB intervenes in the form of purchases by tender in the course of which the Central 
Bank provides liquidity in the form of a single communication to banks for 7 days (once a week). In 2001, 
the Central Bank intervened another technique of loan of liquidity on the money market which was the 
Repurchase Agreement under Tender of banks which were unable to cover their needs in terms of liquidity 
on the interbank market. This technique consists in the transfer of debt securities with an agreement to 
repurchase on a given date, increased by a money market interest rate.  
The third technique is that of injection or aspiration -puncture operations-. Whereby, the Tunisian Central 
Bank involves money market for a period of 24 hours as the case of the situation of liquidity in the market. 
There are two opposite forms which are the following: If there is lack of liquidity on the money market, the 
Central Bank involved last spring to ensure this liquidity on the money market. In contrast, the second case 
where there is liquidity, the Central Bank intervenes to mop up the liquidity on the market.  
The choice of the intermediate target is made taking into account the ability of the monetary authorities to 
regularly monitor the change of the aggregate monetary M2. Indeed, by now the pace of money creation 
constantly compatible with that of economic growth, monetary policy avoids immediately the appearance of 
                                                             
13 Determined considering the evolution of the rate on the interbank market, that of the general index of consumer prices and objectives held regarding monetary 
policy and regarding the credit. 
14 The increase is at present 1 point. 
15 At present it is the rate of call for tenders. 
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any inflationary monetary nature.  
 
3.3. Methods of preparation of the annual monetary policy and control scripts 
 
In the light of the results and progress that had been made in terms of modernization of the structures of the 
financial system, through introduced financial reform, we note that monetary policy has helped to contain 
monetary growth.  
In fact, the average growth rate of the monetary mass M2 during the period [1979-1986] is 15% while that 
of GDP was 4%, whereas, these rates on [1999-2000] are 13.5% and 8,126%, respectively. Monetary policy 
has also helped limit inflation which the rate that was 14%, two digits in 1982, has been reduced to 3% in 
2008. 
 
3.3.1. Main tools of direct control of the TCB 
 
The traditional tool more accompanied by the contribution of  Keynes  J-M (1942), as intermediate means 
to control liquidity in the money market and reach the final objective which is economic growth and the 
reduction of unemployment, as a result was without failure to control inflation to the mid-seventies (oil 
shocks). Monetarists16 Friedman M. (195617), as contrast, have rejected the theory of Keynes in favor of the 
more credible rules18 that can control inflation. According to them, it is more crucially controlling the mass 
money which is now the origin of any growth of inflation.  
Other operational variables that are under the Tunisian Central Bank direction are: the supervision of the 
credit, the discount, minimum reserves and open Market. For the first variable as the name indicates is a 
technical in which the Tunisian Central Bank allows to control the progression of the appropriations 
distributed by banks. In 2012, the Central Bank it appealed because this credit framework is efficient to limit 
the distribution of credits and any source of money creation. 
The second instrument which is the discount by what the Central Bank increases its rediscount to compel 
the other Bank to increase their receivable interest rates whose ultimate goal constrains to grant credits to 
the economic agents by these banks which them even in refinancing. Although, this instrument abandoned 
since 1996 as a method of refinancing Bank, this technical involved the refinancing of banks by the Tunisian 
Central Bank share.  
For the third monetary instrument, statutory reserves, which defined by the fact that second-tier banks 
required to hold an amount (assets) to the Central Bank on unpaid accounts? It is by here that the Central 
Bank, as the case of the period post-revolution 2011, intervened on these detained reserves in its own 
accounts to fit the granting of credits of second-tier banks and control therefore the liquidity on the money 
market by increasing the rate of these reserves. 
 The last instrument that opened Market referred as a technical will allow the Bank Central to modulate the 
orientation of the market rate according to their owns goals, making the choice, without the obligation, to 
buy or sell debt in the interbank market. 
 
3.3.2. Quantitative intermediate targets: the monetary aggregates 
 
The Tunisian Bank Central followed long financial development of the European industrial countries who 
are major trading partners for the Tunisia. Since 1987, in order to prevent the final objective of monetary 
stability, monetary authorities had set an intermediate target bearing on the level of expansion of the 
monetary aggregate M219. The growth of M2 related annually to Tunisian GDP, and to gradually reduce the 
differential rate of inflation recorded with country partners and competitors of the Tunisia.  
The aim is to ensure control of real variables and prices through the control of the monetary aggregates and 
counterparts, mainly lending to the economy. This management was guide through the stability of the 
velocity of circulation of money, defined as the ratio of GDP to the money supply. 
                                                             
16 In questioning the contribution of Keynes, monetarists pronounced to the late 70's to abandon the discretionary measures in favor rules like the famous rule of 
Taylor JB. (1993,1999). 
17 1956, ‘Quantity theory of money a restatement’, ( Fisher, I., 1930 and 1997,  Fischer equation, MV= PQ) 
18 Guillard M. (2002),  Kydland F. and Prescott E. (1977), 
19 The M2 aggregate includes more of the aggregate M1 (M1 = tickets + parts + deposits on accounts with checkbooks), formed quasi-money term deposits, 
certificates of deposit, special savings accounts, currency or in convertible dinars and other amount due to the customer. M2 = M1 + deposits near-cash (almost 
currency). 
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 In 1996, and following the skid of M2, the monetary authorities have chosen the M420 aggregate up to 1999 
and since then, the Central Bank takes into account the evolution of the two aggregates. The stabilization 
program adopts by the countries accompanied by financial reforms allowing the direct finance to develop 
through the activation of stock exchange securities. 
 
Table.2. Monetary aggregates evolution (M3-M2 and M3-M4) in (1996-2013). MDT, unit 
Year M3-M2 M4-M3 
 
Year M3-M2 M4-M3 
1996 854 252 2005 1875 2595 
1997 819 228 2006 1755,65 260,25 
1998 913 357 2007 1655,65 262,65 
1999 991 455 2008 1853,879 256,1 
2000 1083 646 2009 2094,489 203,55 
2001 1350 1326 2010 1799,734 216,45 
2002 1620 2427 2011 1949,383 247,568 
2003 1598 3197 2012 2154 215,4 
2004 1620 2887 2013 2143 39 
Source: Author Attribution, TCB Annual Financial Stat21, 2013. 
Indeed, the encouragement of the investor to participate in the financing of the Government budget, projects, 
or already existing projects promoted by launching new titles of the Government such as negotiable treasury 
bonds in stock exchange in 1993 and the comparable treasury bonds in 1997, has allowed economic agents 
to operate in trade-offs between the different types of monetary investments and financial. 
These new measures combined with the partial liberalization of capital movements and financial innovations 
seem to have made increasing the volatility of money demand (Massoued T. 2004), reducing the 
effectiveness of monetary targeting traditionally used the monetary aggregates became less precise and their 
value as widely disputed intermediate monetary target. 
Indeed, in this period of abundant financial innovation and especially of instability of the behavior of 
economic agents, it may be illusory to follow a monetary aggregate. So, to act on the evolution of monetary 
mass M3 intermediate target, the Central Bank had a set of instruments, including the implementation to 
achieve the desired objective. The key instrument of the device based on the interest rate. 
The Monetary Authority may be front on situation where the only quantitative control of growth in bank 
credit in the framework would more to a limitation of the expansion of the currency and finance. As a result, 
the action on the price of funding by the interest rates is more efficient. However, is it possible in a small 
open economy to act effectively by only interest rates? 
In the past, exactly in 1987, the monetary authorities opted for M2 money supply as intermediate goal. 
Everything similarly, during the period (1987-1995), forecasts of the growth rate of this aggregate, according 
to the statistics22 from the TCB, was not always seem to be carried out. Also, it appears that the Tunisian 
Central Bank TCB can not always achieve its intermediate target during the period studied because of 
discrepancies recorded between the realized and forecasted (cf. refer to annex table). 
 
                                                             
20 M4 = M3 + Government borrowings from the Public (national debt+ the Treasury bills + equipment coupons) + inter companies debt securities that are issued 
on the monetary market. 
21 Annual report: (1996 to 2013). 
22 Financial statistics, (1987-1995) 
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Figure.1.  The evolutions gap of the monetary aggregates (M3-M2 and M4-M3) 
Source : AuthorAttribution, Annual Financial Stat, Dec.2013. 
In these circumstances, the BCT has been changed this target money M2 in 1996 (adoption the monetary 
aggregate M4 instead of M2). But, it lasts three years, given the inadequacy of the monetary target M4 to 
control the evolution of monetary mass, the Tunisian Central Bank in 1999 adopted another indicator of the 
evolution of the presumed final goal more efficient and easily controlled by the monetary authorities, that is 
the intermediate target M3 instead of M4. Thus, the figure.1above shows the offset of the gaps between 
development of these aggregates (M3-M2 and M4-M3) from 1996 until 2013.  
A significant difference between the achievement of the two curves of (M3 - M2) and (M4 - M3) 
development observed during the period [2001-2005]. It reached its maximum of 31.2 points in 2003. During 
the period between [2006-2013], the gap between the standards set and carried out two curves reversed where 
the gap (M3 - M2) growth, compared away from the curve (M4 - M3) which was falling given the increase 
of mass M3 medium regular except some small divinations in 2007 and in 2010, ranging from (4.2 points) 
in 2007 to (2.1 points) in 2010, leaving appear that the Central Bank  was able to control the evolution of the 
monetary aggregate M323 despite difficult political-economy of the country after three years in the Tunisian 
ex-revolution 2011. 
In 2003, the exceptional overtaking of the order 31, 2 points explained, according to the TCB24, as an 
acceleration of M4 that touched many more near-cash availability as the money supply. Monetary authorities 
did not always reach the intermediate goals that they settled. However, the rate of inflation remains restrained 
3.5 in 2003 which implies that the Central Bank proceeds in support of its reputation in terms of transparency 
in the management of monetary policy.  
Since 2010, the TCB acts as if it had a range of indicators that it used to control monetary policy by 
manipulating a rule of M3 monetary growth, as shown by the curve (M3 - M2) growth until the end of 2013 
and an interest rate which changes influence its decisions, and more. However, although the rate of inflation 
was not master during this period of economic recession experienced by the country until the end of 2013, 
the fields of application of an independent monetary policy remains dependent on the nature of the regime 
change and the mobility of capital (Masson et al., 1997) and the intermediary target monetary held by TCB 
to control skyrocket inflation 6.1% in late 2013. Most noticing by the figure.1, the difference of these two 
curves of the monetary mass (M3-M2 and M4-M3) was sinking in (2011-2013). Showing in obvious fact 
the financial gravity and the economic downturn experienced by the country, during this period. What model 
could hold the TCB in these difficult macroeconomic conditions, a target inflation will it be the solution? Is 
the TCB in favor of this strategy, which depends on the preconditions for their actual implementation? Seen 
that the country currently in the end of 2013 crosses economic difficulties, are these conditions achievable 
                                                             
23 M3 = M2 + contract deposits+ bonds issued by banks. 
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by the Central Bank of Tunisia?   
 
3.4. Inflation targeting possibility in Tunisian economic 
The transition to the policy of targeting inflation in Tunisia remains an interesting opportunity to win in price 
stability25. It will allow different domestic and foreign stakeholders to build correct forecasts and formulate 
good expectations on the economic environment in which they are investing. However, the requirements of 
this policy remain very restrictive for the country in the sense that the Tunisian capital markets do not have 
depth and efficiency needed for its implementation until yet. 
 
3.4.1. Inflation Targeting Policy and transparency: industrial countries and satisfactory results 
 
Inflation Targeting Policy seeks action26 on inflation. Indeed, when inflation attempts to deviate from its 
target, the Central Bank uses monetary policy instruments to align inflation laid down on the lens. It is as 
well as several researches conducted Mishkin F.S. (2000b, 2010) to determine the appropriate instrument to 
conduct such a policy. Taylor J.  (1997) was the pioneer who proposed an instrument of conduct of monetary 
policy for the Bank federal reserve of the United States called "Taylor rule".    
Given the simplicity of this rule and since it reduces the econometric investigations, it has gradually emerged 
as a rule of reference for most of the empirical work even though its original purpose was more descriptive 
than normative. In one more elaborate way, other then optimal generally qualified normative rules can be 
derived from small macroeconomic models. 
Among the most elaborate works of inflation targeting, which allowed building a solid theoretical framework 
which governs this new approach is that of Svensson L. (1997). This work includes an equation specifying 
the "loss function" of the Bank Central and meant to represent the relative importance of the objectives that 
it continues. These rules, which are refer to as optimal called functions of reactions of central banks. These 
functions are different from one country to another and from one period to another for the same country. 
Thus, having regard to the importance of implementation of the policy of inflation targeting and the 
obligation and to rely on the prerequisites for their adoption to acquire relevant results: we refer to experience 
foreign to the four countries, considered, pioneers in this area namely (New Zealand, the Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the Sweden). The particular emphasis on the behavior of the Central Bank of New Zealand in 
the case of inflation targeting has been during the period from 1990 to 2005.  
This is due to several reasons, on the one hand, New Zealand is the first country which has adopted the policy 
of inflation targeting, so this is the greatest experience of this Central Bank in this policy. On the other hand, 
the Central Bank of New Zealand is the single Central Bank that has published data on forecasts of inflation 
in a number of significant years. 
• It seems that the dynamics of inflation be amended in these countries that have adopted this strategy during 
the period after the implementation of the targets. An explicit policy of inflation targeting may tend to favor 
the stationary of the process by not allowing the emergence of permanent shocks on inflation. 
• It appears on the other hand, as much credibility Patrick P. and Robert A. (2000) monetary policy is 
reflected on these financial markets, where long-term rates are less influenced by fluctuations in inflation. 
Thus, economic agents anticipate that shocks observed in the short term will not affect inflation realized over 
a long enough time horizon (10 years and more). 
Furthermore, the strategy based on a direct inflation target seems a bit difficult to manage because it guided 
by conditions key including paramount importance given to the inflation target while leaving the Central 
Bank a margin of flexibility, which was not yet sufficiently, met Schaecheter A. and Stone R. and M. Zelmer 
(2000) in the context of the monetary policy of the developing countries (PED). 
 
3.4.2. Prerequisites in the implementation of this strategy: operational aspects 
 
On the institutional level, current efforts are to give the Central Bank the opportunity to move from a 
traditional control of the evolution of monetary aggregates to the use of the interest rate as instrument27 of 
which, by changing its level, will affect economic transactions and the level of prices. 
Under this policy, the Central Bank must declare its adoption of this policy as well as the target, unilaterally 
                                                             
25 Agenor P R., (2000a): the World Bank, 45. N -87, p.47 
26 ITP: Inflation Targeting Policy is a framework for the implementation of monetary policy with monitored freedom which forced the Central Bank to ensure low 
inflation, by setting an explicit target to wait in a period in a given period (e.g. a rate of inflation 2% for the next two years 2012-2013). 
27 Taylor J.B. (1999) 
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or commonly known with the Government which is likely to strengthen its independence. 
The choice of the target must be accompanied by an appropriate time horizon. The choice of a too short 
period may not let the Central Bank a sufficient margin to achieve its objectives28 and meet its commitments. 
The choice of a too long time horizon affects its credibility. 
We can summarize the necessary factors for success this policy in the following points:  
• A stable macroeconomic environment and a balanced budget situation in which the budget deficit located 
at tolerable levels. 
• A developed and deep financial system that allows certain fluidity in transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy as well as a dynamic securities exchange with a large market capitalization and dynamic secondary 
markets. 
• Delineate the role of the Central Bank by quoting, in its statute that its role is to preserve the stability of 
prices Freedman, C., (1996) and read accurately, confer, thus, independence in the use of suitable 
instruments29 that allow it to achieve its objectives. 
• A good understanding of the different relationships between economic variables and inflation to better 
understand and measure the effects of monetary policy and its transmission channels to the economy. 
• Have the necessary means for the construction of reliable forecasts and thus take the appropriate decisions. 
• Adopt transparency in the implementation of monetary policy through the publication of regular reports 
analyzing the components of inflation and explaining policy and arguing the decisions of the Central 
Bank. This will strengthen the confidence of economic agents and the credibility of monetary policy. 
 
3.4.3. What difficulties in front of the realization of this policy in period of post-revolution? 
 
What is remarkable in Tunisia after two years of the 2011 revolution, the verification of these conditions 
makes it difficult to adopt the policy of inflation targeting, for several reasons: 
• An economic context, in the end of 2013, characterized by the resurgence with inflationary pressure 
and their risk of persistence for 2014. 
• The Central bank continues the pursuit of the contraction of bank liquidity from 2012 to ensure price 
stability and to provide liquidity to banks for the financing of the economy and therefore the prelaunch 
of economic activity.   
• The fragility of the banking system which suffers from a significant level of classified receivables and 
the weakness of the monetary base which increases the risks within a framework of rigidity of interest 
rates. 
• The weakness of the market capitalization and lack of dynamism in the securities transaction and the 
virtual absence of the secondary market that limit the effectiveness of the interest rate in the valuation 
of securities. 
• Low quantitative and qualitative information on the follow-up of the economic conditions that limit 
the ability to forecast the future and global economic climate. 
• The lack of in-depth studies and econometric models for the analysis of the relationship between 
changes in economic variables and inflation and which to better understand the transmission 
mechanisms of monetary policy in different economic sectors.  
• The result is a lack of both short-term forecasts of long-term inflation rate. In addition, the exchange 
rate regime which is not enough floating. 
 
3.4.4. What role assigned to the Central Bank (TCB)? 
After three years of the revolution 2011, the CPI consumer price index has passed to high unusual levels 
beyond 5%, was established to 5.7% in 2012 and 6.2% in 2013. The persistence of price pressures has led 
the Central Bank to learn other measures to control the inflation30 rate, 6.1% in the end of 2013 and stabilize 
at levels close to European partner countries. To do this the Government has dismissed any influence on 
monetary policy, as a result, the TCB is actually characterized by its own autonomy and independence from 
late 2011 to handle monetary policy and the banking system in general.  
Thus, the Central Bank after this phase post-revolution 2011 must take a number of measures in order to 
                                                             
28 Bernanke.B. et Mishkin.F. (1997) 
29 Taher and Rahmani  (2006): "Taylor's rule, exchange rates and asset prices: case of the Tunisia". 5th day of Economics financial,-Tunisia,  April 2006. pp.1-26. 
30 cf. annual report Central Bank 2012. (Ibid. 2013). 
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increase the credibility of monetary policy to the public, such as the announcement of a monetary rule 
consolidated by a transparency program. Indeed, in announcing a monetary rule, monetary authorities had 
two attitudes. They can either respect it or be tempted to not respect and opt to deny their initial commitment. 
The trade-off between these two alternatives is made depending on whether the monetary authorities had 
concerns and short-term considerations or care about the sanction to long term on the part of the markets and 
the public. 
The control of inflation will also reduce the pressure on the dinar, which will ensure a better stability of its 
value, and therefore, a risk mitigation of change inherent in the national currency, a major element that 
erroneous forecast of domestic and foreign investors. 
In an uncertain environment Meyer L. (2005), the continuous display of stability policies constitutes a 
decisive element of credibility. Economic policy must send clear signals to the agents and markets. In order 
to sit its credibility, the Central Bank must be based on transparency and the coordination of policies. 
In the implementation of its appropriate strategy, the Central Bank (TCB) has to report to public his actions 
and the results it obtains. Targets represent an implicit agreement between the Central Bank and the public. 
In this way, monetary authorities assume a greater responsibility towards the public, in so far as the latter 
adjusts his expectations of inflation objective mentioned by the Central Bank. 
We note that texts organic of the Central Bank, revised31 in 2006, clarified further the role of the TCB in 
monetary policy. They could usefully be clarified in the sharing of responsibilities between the Government 
and the Central Bank regards the policy exchange and the management of the public debt. 
Based on statistics published by the TCB or broadcast on the Internet site, we found that the distinction is 
clear between the monetary policy operations i.e. those carried out on the money market in terms of amounts 
and rates (injection or aspiration, tender, taking pension, etc.) and lender of last resort, in the regulatory 
framework as the disclosed data which would gave a clearer vision of the nature of the interventions of the 
Central Bank. 
A current reform on the modernization of the payments system should be accompanied by new legislation 
consistent with international standards and indicating the distribution of responsibilities and terms of the 
system operation. 
Whenever the Central Bank modifies one of the elements of its monetary policy (interest rates, intermediate 
target, etc.), the explanation of the reasons that motivated this change through the publication of a press 
release is likely to provide useful information on the monetary credibility. Thus, the announcement and the 
precision of the objectives of long and short-term, as well as, detailed rules32 for the TCB on the money 
market interventions can clarify the commitment to achieve the ultimate objective of monetary policy. 
Since the public knows that the monetary authorities can, for short-term considerations, derive from their 
commitments, they must implement a device Barro R.J and Gorden D.B. (1983) that will help them to 
continuously consolidate the credibility of monetary policy. In the case of the TCB, this device must aim to 
increase the degree of transparency and allow the public to better assess initiatives and the work performed. 
Similarly, the announcement of the intervention by the Central Bank rate changes would clarify the role of 
the latter in the conduct of monetary policy and gave more credibility to the conduct of monetary policy. 
Thus, discretionary interventions from the TCB to avoid slippage registered affect their credibility as they 
do not publish the growth rate of the monetary aggregate M3 target in time. That is, they publish the standards 
of the following year at the end of the current year. These rates have published during the month of June of 
the current year. 
However, the publication of the annual monetary targets as the rate of inflation and the growth of the 
                                                             
31 Article 33 revised in May 2006: "the text of the amendment in question also reinforces the independence of the TCB by eliminating any form of monetary 
financing, what of swear means the ban now use practices windsurfing ticket or monetization of the government deficit and therefore any form of direct financing 
of the public Treasury." the TCB cannot grant Treasury overdrafts or loans or acquiring securities issued by the State in the primary market. Inputs of the amendment 
also cover the strengthening of communication policy by the publication of the decisions of the Governing Council and the submission of the financial statements 
of the TCB to an external audit exercised by two Commissioners to the accounts'. (TCB, Dec. 2006). 
32 Pursuant to section 33 new laws N° 2006-26 of May 15, 2006, amending the law n ° 58-90 of 19 September, 1958 on the establishment and organization of the 
Tunisian Central Bank (TCB) "the main task of monetary policy is the preservation of price stability. Indeed, a good control of inflation, as reflected by the changes 
in the index prices to consumption (IPC), allows ensuring non-inflationary growth contributing to job creation and the improvement of good welfare through the 
preservation of the purchasing power. To do this, the BCT, through the instruments at its disposal, influence the interest rate of the relevant currency market as the 
main instrument for the conduct of monetary policy in order to achieve the final objective of price stability. This monetary policy framework is based, in addition 
to the monetary aggregates and credit, on a diverse range of indicators closely linked to inflation. Include this as the import price, the output gap, underlying 
inflation, etc. Given the importance of the forecast inflation for this monetary policy framework, great efforts are being deployed with the TCB to implement a 
feature analysis and forecast of the short and medium term inflation which will serve as a reference for decision-making on monetary policy and a means of 
communication with the public. This approach fits in the context of the development and the strengthening of the analytical framework to better understand the 
different channels of monetary policy transmission and simulate the impact, including variation in the rate on the main economic variables". 
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monetary mass of the beginning of the year would increase the transparency of monetary policy. The display 
of a rule can be used to protect the monetary authorities by immune interventions short-term policy makers 
or the public opinion and isolate the conduct of monetary action by the electoral timelines. The problem of 
inconsistency temporary Daniel L. (1997) is thus avoided as demonstrated by the founding work 33 of 
Kydland and Prescott (1977). However, some Central Banks, by choosing the opacity to protect them from 
political power, the public opinion or market pressures are able to ensure their policy of price stability. 
Analysis of the issue of the credibility of monetary policy has shown that certain technical aspects of the 
behavior of the Central Bank are likely to either compromise, or promote the credibility of monetary policy. 
With regard to the TCB, it turns out that it defines clearly its objectives of monetary policy ("preserve the 
value of the currency while maintaining the rate of inflation to a level close to that observed in the European 
partners countries and competitors')34, informs the public of its strategy and explains how its initiatives 




Figure.2. Inflation rate and its underlying in annual sliding for period [1990-2013] 
Source: SNI, January 2013. 
This graph, showing the annual sliding of the inflation from 1990 until 2013 and its underlying, can be 
decomposed  into two major periods: the first (1990-2005) during which annual inflation rate compared with 
that of its underlying a continuous decreased gradually until 2005. In this period the Government followed 
a structural plan to modernize the Bank System and gradually released the financial market. The country's 
macroeconomic situation has improved towards the end of the early 90's until the end of 2005, where the 
average inflation rate is around 3.4%.   
Concerning the second phase (2006-2013), according to the chart (fig. 2) we note as of the beginning of 2006 
until current 2013, inflation has increased gradually each year from 3.8% at the beginning of 2006 to 4.8 on 
2008. This rate is some what supported (2009-2010) with an average inflation rate of 3.7%. But most noticing 
it is on 2011 the year of the Tunisian revolution where inflation was in annual increasing until end of 2013 
under the effect of the degradation of the country's economic circumstances and even what to lost of the 
country's image is serious notes (BB- in early 2013) of the International Rating Institutions like Standard & 
Poor's35 in the end of 2012. 
 
                                                             
33 For Kydland and Prescott (1977):  the Government uses discretionary policy for some time to ' deceive' economic agents and beyond significantly improve its 
economic record. To turn this effect, these authors have formulated a maxim-based: "the rule against the Discretion". In fact, the rule will allow the Government 
to improve the social good, without the discretionary use. 
34  cf. TCB Challenges report. 
35 Source: AFP 2013; The mark awarded to the debt the country's long term changes from "BB-" to "B", reflecting low Standards & Poor's confidence in the ability 
of the country to meet its financial commitments. This note is accompanied by a negative development perspective. http://www.africanmanager.com/154338.html 
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Figure.3. Fluctuation in the inflation rate compared to the price indices: annual sliding [on 2005: 02 to 
2013] 
 
Source: SNI, January 2013. 
 
Inflation accelerated in 2006, causing the Central Bank TCB to respond and meet its director 25 basis points 
interest rate, first settling in three years. The annual rate of increase of consumer prices rose by 2% in 2005 
to 4.5% for the first 10 months of 2006. This acceleration in inflation is mainly due to increases in 
international prices of oil and some commodities prices (inflation of base, excluding products energy and 
food, for the 10 first months of 2006 is 3%, compared to 2.5% in 2005). 
It also reflects the effect delay of the increase in the price of oil on adjustments of rates of transport of end 
of 2005. Furthermore, the strength of domestic demand and the gradual depreciation of the nominal effective 
exchange rate probably also contribute to inflationary pressure. 
An effect noticing in 2007, inflation again decreased to 2.8%, indicating a macroeconomic stability, fast fires 
again at the end of the year under the impact of the oil crisis in July 2007 for expected 5.5% in December 
2007. Furthermore, as a result of the financial crisis 2008, the inflation rate continued its rise with 6% for 
the first quarter and is finished by a deceleration until the first months of 2009 with a rate described as stable 
surrounding of 3%. But quickly this rate of inflation occurs again given the non stability of the global 
economic environment, registering a jump of 2 points rise for the first months of 2010. Given that the 
economic situation of the country after two years of the financial crisis has registered a gradual return to his 
current's economic stability is as well as inflation declined one point to reach 4% in early 2011.  
For the period (2011-2013), the country has seen major economic shocks just after the year of the revolution 
2011. Within the economic recession and the deterioration of production, for the two years of the revolution, 
inflation accelerated more than three points compared to the annual average rate (3%) in 2010 mitigating in 
2013 an annual 6.2% rate.  
 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
It is true that the adoption of various strategies to control and reduce inflation depends on likely 
considerations which vary from one country to another. Although, most of these countries that today target 
inflation have adopted this approach recently, though, the results so far are encouraging, as argued by 
participants at a recent seminar in IMF high level on the targeting of inflation in 2010. However, this strategy 
suggests conditions less told important for their actual implementation depending on each country's 
economic and financial context.  The case of the Tunisia: where the economic circumstances from 2009 to 
2011 prove major shakes, making it impossible to adopt into account this strategy of inflation targeting by 
the Tunisian Central Bank. Given that the country was in a period of non-political and economic stability. It 
is thus that the credibility and the transparency of monetary policy from the TCB to economic agents and 
investors are uncertain and unreal with a politico-economic environment very moving after the revolution 
2011. That activates an inflation rate of 6.1% in 2013 against 2.4% in 2009, unregistered for more than nearly 
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two decades earlier.  
Furthermore, in Tunisia, the best way to reduce uncertainty is the publication by the Central Bank of its 
forecasts and, possibly, to explain the conditions for their execution. As inflation reacts with some delay, the 
monetary authorities must explain their short and medium term strategy for monetary policy and the factors 
that influence their decisions in a manner clear and frequent, prior to the acquisition of a real credibility. The 
Central Bank must take Masson R., Savastano A. and Sharma, S. (1998), on the other hand, a certain number 
of measures to enhance the credibility of monetary policy to the public, such as the announcement of a 
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ANNEXES 
 
Table.2. Evolution of the monetary aggregates gaps [1996.12 - 2013.12] 














Result 12505 13,1 9618 13,8 8764 13,9 854 13,
6 
2887 10,7 
 Prevision 12018 8,7 9183 8,7 8380 8,9 797 6 2807 7,6 
 Gap 487  435  384  57  80  
DEC 
1997 
Result 13567 8,6 10981 14,2 10162 16 819 -4,1 2595 -10,1 
 Result 12810 10 9495 8 8852 7,9 607 8,8 3351 16,2 
 Gap 765  1522  1310  212  -756  
DEC 
1998 
Result 14836 9,3 11639 6 10726 5,6 913 11,
5 
3197 23,2 
 Prevision 13943 9,1 10908 7,2 10226 7 682 10 3035 -5,1 
 Gap 893  731  500  231  162  
DEC 
1999 
Result 16234 9,3 13807 18,6 12186 19,5 991 8.5 2427 -24,4 
 Prevision 14019 0,7 11688 9,1 10988 9,2 700 7,9 2331 -27,2 
 Gap 2215  2119   1828  291  96 
DEC 
2000 
Result 16960 4,5 15634 13,2 14551 13,5 1083 9,3 1326 -45,4 
 Prevision 16769 3,3 15102 9,4 14021 9,4 1081,0 9,1 1667,0 -31,3 
 Gap 191  532,0  530,0  2,0  -341,0  
DEC 
2001 
Result 18048 6,4 17402,0 11,3 16052,0 10,3 1350,0 24,
7 
646,0 -51,3 
 Prevision 17913 5,0 16688,0 9,5 15571,0 9,7 1117,0 7,2 1225,0 -3,3 
 Gap 135  714,0  481,0  233,0  -579,0  
DEC 
2002 
Result 18757 3,9 18302,0 5,2 16682,0 3,9 1620,0 20,
0 
455,0 -29,6 
 Prevision 18974 5,1 18474,0 6,2 16694,0 4,0 1780,0 31,
9 
500,0 -22,6 
 Gap -217  -172,0  -12,0  -160,0  -45,0  
DEC 
2003 
Result 19814 5,6 19457,0 6,3 17859,0 7,1 1598,0 -1,4 357,0 -21,5 
 Prevision 20484 8,0 20027,0 8,4 18030,0 8,0 1997,0 12,
2 
457,0 -8,6 
 Gap -670  -570,0  -171,0  -399,0  -100,0  
DEC 
2004 
Result 21694 9,5 21466 10,3 19846 11,1 1620,0 1,4 228,0 8,9 
 Prevision 21694 7,8 21303 7,9 19475 7,6 1828,0 10,
9 
391,0 3,5 
 Gap 0  163  371  -208,0  -163,0  
DEC 
2005 
Result 22997 7,6 22745 7,6 20870 7,3 1875,0 8,4 252,0 4,4 
 Prevision 22997 7,6 22745 7,6 20870 7,3 1875,0 8,4 252,0 7,2 
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1,3 2094,489 9,1 203,55
0   
16,2 
DEC 
2010   
Result 40081,243   1,9 39864,793 1,1 38065,059   1,6 1799,734   5,5 216,450      10,1 
DEC 
2011    
Result 43794,964   1,1 43547,396 1,2 41598,013 1,1 1949,383    8,7 247,568     -1,1 
DEC 
2012     
Result 47169,0 1,3 46872,0    1,4 44718,0 2,1 2154,0       0,1 2154,0 14,2 
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DEC 
2013 
Result 50272,0 1,2 50233,0 1,3 48090,0 2,2 2143,0 32,
4 
39,0 - 
Sources : SNI, Financial annuel TCB. 2013 
              
 
 
